by Bhaswati Sarkar & Ankita Dutta

Centre for European Studies School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University, 19 October 2025

Source: https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2019/05/social-media-code-conduct-election-commission-india/

Rapid strides in information technology have opened up new opportunities to consume and share news, views and ideas. The implication of information technology on the democratic political systems does not need to be established. The use of digital spaces and platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, WhatsApp, have become a defining feature in the way elections are being conducted today. Political parties compete with each other to influence and dominate the online space both to create favourable narratives and discredit competitors. India is no exception. As the access to internet increases, the digital space has established itself as an arena of increased political communication and contest. This blog analyses the impact of digital media on Indian elections and looks at various regulations that New Delhi has adopted to manage the digital space.

India has emerged as thriving digital economy, and by almost every digital indicator – internet access, mobile access, data use and consumption, start-ups, unicorns, and trade-in services – India appears to be a digital power. The Indian government has been actively engaged in the country’s digitalisation. Its flagship programme, Digital India, which is structured around nine key pillars, is aimed at transforming India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy. It involves three main components: creating accessible digital infrastructures, providing services digitally, and promoting digital literacy among citizens. This initiative has been successful in expanding the internet access and improved public services through Digital Public Infrastructure (which is a combination of digital identity, digital payment infrastructure and data exchange solutions). Since the launch of the initiative, internet connections have increased from 251.5 million in March 2014 to 969.6 million in June 2024, registering a growth of 285.53%. Broadband connections rose from 61 million in March 2014 to 949.2 million in August, 2024 growing by 1452%. Moreover, India accounted for 49% of global real-time transaction in 2023, making it the leading country in digital payments.

During elections, the political outreach that the ‘digispace’ provides has been about narrative and image building of political leaders and their party. But this space is also open to misuse by misinformation, disinformation and propaganda. Therefore, effectively regulating this space is an imperative for meaningful conduct of politics in general and elections in particular.

India has strengthened its regulatory framework to manage online platforms overall. The rights and responsibilities of online platforms are regulated by Section 79 of the Information Technology Act of 2000, which places responsibility of due diligence on network service providers to remove or disable access to illegal or false information. The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 have sought to further regulate social media platforms. Amendments introduced in April 2023 conferred new powers for the government to exercise censorship and calls on social and media platforms to remove posts deemed fake or false. This is to ensure data privacy, net neutrality, and most importantly, accountability of social media platforms, including X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, and Meta. These frameworks along with the Indian Penal Code and framework of the twin acts, namely the Representation of People Act, 1950 and 1951 forms the core of legal instruments implemented by India in regulating its online space. While the amendments sought to regulate the online space, these provisions have been critcised for curtailing rights of the people, over-censorship, and concerns about creation of an appellate authority which might not be independent of the executive.

With respect to elections, the responsibility of ensuring free and fair polls. rests with the Election Commission of India (ECI). The ECI issues guidelines and advisories related to the use of social media by political parties and candidates. Since 2008, it has made attempts to regulate the digital space. In 2013, the ECI formulated guidelines for social media companies, candidates, political parties and third parties. For instance, disclosure of  social media accounts for candidates when filing their nominations was made mandatory. Political parties and candidates were also required to publish their expenditure incurred on social media. Further, at the state and district levels parties’ political advertisements shared across online platforms required prior certification by Media Certification and Monitoring Committees (MCMC).

The 2014 parliamentary elections that led BJP leader Modi to power marked a turning point in the use of digital space for party electioneering. PM Modi’s 2014 success has been attributed to his innovative social media outreach. The Financial Times went so far as to call him India’s “first social media prime minister”. A month within becoming the prime minister, PM Modi increased his online popularity on Facebook, becoming the world’s second most popular head of a state after US President Obama. In 2017 a report released by PR firm Burson-Marstellar showed Prime Minister Modi with 40 million Facebook followers on his personal page – the world’s most followed leader. In 2024, he became the most followed global leader on the social media platform X. With over 100 million followers, Prime Minister Modi outperforms Virat Kohli (64.1 million) and Taylor Swift (95.3 million).

While BJP retains its first mover advantage on social media presence, other parties have caught up. Consequently, the digital space needs to be better regulated due to platforms’ ability of polarisation by microtargeting and misinformation. In 2018, ECI set up the Sinha Committee to look into the feasibility of regulating social media advertising during election campaigns and ways to prevent its misuse (No. 491/RPA/2017/Communication). For the 2019 elections, a voluntary code of ethics  was signed by ECI and Internet and Mobile Association of India. The social media companies agreed to conduct education and awareness campaigns, and establish a fast-track grievance redress channel to take action on objectionable posts reported to the ECI. They also agreed to pre-certification requirements and to take action within three hours of reported violations of the mandatory 48-hour period of no-campaigning.

On the ground the “voluntary code of ethics” had at best limited impact. During the 2019 elections, millions of fake or misleading posts were uploaded particularly on Facebook, Twitter, Google and WhatsApp, only 909 posts were taken down by the social media platforms and of the 510 code violations just 75 were analysed by the ECI but no penalties were imposed. The 2014 Lok Sabha election was dubbed as “social media elections’” and 2019 was referred to as the “WhatsApp election”, the elections of 2024 can be referred to as dominated by the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

The elections of 2024 were conducted in seven phases spread over two months involving over 960 million voters. The Model Code of Conduct kicked in from 16th March 2024. This election stands out for the use of generative A Political parties and candidates used AI extensively to enhance their messaging to a diverse, multilingual electorate. AI was also frequently used for spreading misleading information through use of fake audio, propaganda images, and parodies. While AI was used to scale the messaging, it was used mostly without repercussions and lack of transparency. Of particular concern were the “deep fakes”, which distorted content and spread fake information/misinformation/disinformation. For example, an AI-generated deepfake video surfaced featuring late Member of Parliament H. Vasanthakumar endorsing his son’s Congress candidacy; or AI-generated videos of Prime Minister Modi and other leaders like Mamta Banerjee were also circulated during the campaign cycle.

The ECI issued a circular for the “responsible and ethical use of social media platforms and strict avoidance of any wrongful use by political parties and their representatives.” In its Press Note published on 14 May 2024, the ECI noted that it had received 425 major complaints of which 400 had been addressed. However, the ECI was accused by the opposition parties and civil society groups for failing to act against violation of MCC, related to communal content posted online by political actors for voter appeasement. ECI was also accused of failing to take note of speeches being made on caste, community, or religious lines at the right time, meant that the intended damage was done.

In the coming years, the use of social media in Indian elections is only likely to grow. India requires robust enforcement and monitoring capacity to track political advertising, labeling, disclosure, and limit on microtargeting. As platforms play a critical role in information dissemination and may not fully comply with over-regulation, the government needs to work with these platforms for content-moderation, automation and ad-review to reduce disinformation. While strong regulatory framework with robust and impartial implementation is critical, civil society organisations play an important role both in protecting freedom of expression from government overreach and sensitising people about misinformation. Equally, if not more important, is the commitment of political players themselves to use digital platforms responsibly.

The post Digital Media and India’s Changing Electoral Landscape appeared first on Digital political campaigning.

By Ronald Sáenz-Leandro, PhD Candidate, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), Barcelona, Spain

25 September 2025

Digital technologies are now an integral part of Latin America’s political campaigns. While television and radio remain parties’ preferred communication channels, particularly in Mexico, platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, TikTok, and X have rapidly become electoral battlegrounds of persuasion, mobilization, and, increasingly, disinformation. Yet unlike the European Union’s recent push for hard or soft digital regulatory measures, the Latin American regulatory response remain fragmented, oscillating between judicial activism, regulatory vacuum, and voluntary self-regulation.

This blog post explores three contrasting cases – Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay – to illustrate each country’s distinct regulatory pathway. We then provide a comparative snapshot of the region, highlighting the challenges of digital campaign governance where democratic resilience coexists with fragility and, in some instances, authoritarian drift.

Brazil: Judicial Activism and Pending Legislation

In Brazil, disinformation became a central political issue during the 2018 elections, when coordinated campaigns on WhatsApp fueled polarization. Since then, the judiciary has assumed an increasingly proactive role. Law 13.834/2019 criminalized false allegations against candidates, and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) established permanent programs to combat electoral disinformation. These measures faced relatively little opposition at the time, as they were framed narrowly around protecting the integrity of the electoral process.

The proposed Lei Brasileira de Liberdade, Responsabilidade e Transparência na Internet (PL 2.630/2020), also known as the “fake news bill,” sought to regulate digital platforms more broadly by requiring user identification and content traceability. While approved in the Senate, the bill has faced resistance from civil society groups and remains pending in Congress. The “fake news bill” later became the focal point of controversy, drawing criticism from civil society and digital rights organizations concerned about its potential impact on freedom of expression and privacy. Critics argue that the provisions on traceability could compromise users’ privacy and facilitate surveillance, while the broad scope of the bill risks stifling legitimate speech by delegating excessive powers to state authorities and platforms.

Meanwhile, the TSE and the Supreme Federal Court have developed their own regulatory mechanisms to tackle instances of online disinformation. The creation of the Integrated Center for Confronting Disinformation and Defense of Democracy in 2024 formalized collaboration between public authorities, the judiciary, and platforms like Meta, Google, and TikTok. Yet this activism has sparked concerns about judicial overreach. The confrontation between Justice Alexandre de Moraes and Elon Musk in 2024, when X was temporarily blocked in Brazil, illustrates the tension between safeguarding democratic integrity and preserving freedom of expression.

Brazil exemplifies a path of strong regulatory intervention, but one heavily reliant on courts rather than parliamentary debate. This duality highlights both the country’s capacity for rapid institutional response to digital threats and the ongoing controversy over whether judicial activism is an adequate substitute for broader, democratic deliberation on regulation.

Mexico: Legal Vacuum and De Facto Self-Regulation

In stark contrast, Mexico has pursued an approach leaving digital campaigning largely unregulated. The Mexican Constitution protects freedom of expression and prohibits prior censorship, meaning that authorities cannot block or restrict content before it is published, even in the context of electoral campaigns, and electoral law continues to emphasize the allocation of free broadcast time in television and radio as the central output of political communication.

Currently, only party actors are penalized if found to deliberately spread false information about the electoral process, which leaves misinformation circulating online broadly unchecked. In practice this means that citizens, media outlets, and other non-electoral actors are not subject to equivalent sanctions, creating a regulatory gap where disinformation can spread without legal consequences unless it originates directly from candidates or parties.

Attempts to legislate digital risks have been limited. In 2023, the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), together with other institutions, presented the Carta de Derechos de la Persona en el Entorno Digital: a code of practice aimed at safeguarding fundamental rights online such as freedom of expression, privacy, security, and access to information. The document was not a formal bill introduced in Congress but rather a call for a regulatory framework that protects human rights in the digital sphere, similar to those already existing in the offline world. In parallel, UNAM’s Program on Democracy, Justice and Society advanced a Decálogo de Derechos Digitales en Redes Sociales, an initial legislative proposal seeking to protect social media users from platform abuses by enshrining rights such as freedom of expression, data privacy, the right to be forgotten, child protection, non-discrimination, and transparency.

According to the initiative’s official site , the Decálogo is still in the stage of collecting citizen signatures, and neither it nor the Carta has yet translated into formal legislation. While the Decálogo continues to seek public backing, the Carta has remained essentially a declaration of intent without following the same advocacy pathway.

As highlighted by scholars of Mexican political communication, this regulatory inertia has opened the door to growing technopolitics where parties, influencers, and even troll farms operate freely online. Faced with this, authorities and civil society often emphasize autorregulación: the voluntary adaptation of regulatory measures by parties, platforms, and citizens, rather than formal legal instruments.

While Mexico lacks a direct counterpart to the EU’s Code of Practice on Disinformation, there are examples of soft regulatory tools and initiatives that perform similar functions in practice. For instance, ahead of the 2024 presidential election, INE partnered with media organizations and platforms via organizations such as Meedan to amplify reliable content. Meedan is a global non-profit that develops open-source tools and supports digital media literacy and fact-checking initiatives. In March 2025, legal reforms strengthened transparency and personal data protection laws that, while not electoral regulation per se, contribute to the broader online information ecosystem.

The debate resurfaced in April 2025 with the proposal of a new Telecommunications Law. The draft included a controversial article granting the Agency for Digital Transformation and Telecommunications the power to temporarily block digital platforms for non-compliance with regulatory obligations without clarifying the applicable cases. However, facing strong criticism from the opposition, major broadcasters such as Televisa and TV Azteca, and freedom of expression organizations, President Claudia Sheinbaum ordered legislators to halt its approval, and asked the Senate to open a broader discussion to amend or remove the article. Sheinbaum insisted that her administration did not intend to censor content and that the law must avoid any ambiguity suggesting otherwise, underscoring the tensions between state regulatory ambitions and the defense of a liberal model of political communication.

Mexico thus embodies a deliberate preference for legal silence, framed as a safeguard against potential censorship but criticized for its inability to confront the manipulation of online spaces. While autoregulation by parties, platforms, and civil society has filled part of this gap, such measures have proven insufficient, underscoring the need for more robust and comprehensive legislation to effectively address the risks of digital campaigning.

Uruguay: Ethical Pacts and Soft Co-Regulation

Uruguay represents a third pathway, grounded less in punitive legislation and more in political culture and voluntary agreements. The country has long protected freedom of expression, with its Press Law (1989) only penalizing false information that gravely disrupts public order or damages the state’s economic stability.

More relevant to digital campaigning are the Pactos Éticos contra la Desinformación signed by political parties in 2019 and renewed in 2024. These voluntary agreements committed parties to refrain from spreading fake news or disinformation during campaigns, emphasizing shared responsibility rather than legal compulsion. While not legally binding, the pacts have been praised as a democratic innovation that strengthens trust in electoral competition. This cooperative approach contrasts with the securitized responses of neighboring countries.

To date, there are no formal accountability mechanisms beyond public opinion and peer pressure when parties renege on the Pactos, but at present there have been no major instances of this occurring. All major political forces signed the pacts, which have thus far been largely respected, though their effectiveness ultimately depends on long-term voluntary compliance.

Beyond party self-regulation, hard regulatory tools exist in Uruguay but primarily address traditional media. The Press Law criminalizes knowingly disseminating false news via traditional media, and the Law of Audiovisual Content Diffusion (2024) updated regulation of audiovisual services. There is also legally mandated election advertising vedas for TV and radio which halts campaigning 48 hours before polling day. However, these laws often do not apply to digital platforms and other online services. Some proposed laws seek to penalize misleading or manipulated content during elections, but they frequently exclude platforms (leaving digital actors out). The Pactos remain important for parties but lack strong enforcement mechanisms.

By leveraging its strong institutional credibility and consensual political culture, Uruguay has managed to position ethical co-regulation as a viable tool for safeguarding electoral integrity in the digital age.

A Regional Panorama: Diverging Responses

Beyond these three cases, Latin America has exhibited a plethora of regulatory initiatives:

• Argentina: Numerous bills have been introduced since 2019, including a 2024 proposal for labeling user identities (human, bot, multi-account). None have been approved, reflecting both political deadlock and concerns about censorship.

• Chile: At least 12 bills sought to regulate online disinformation between 2018 and 2023, while the Ministry of Science convened a Commission on Disinformation in 2023. However, no binding regulation has emerged.

• Costa Rica: With no specific law against disinformation, the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) proposed reforms in 2023 to update the Electoral Code, addressing online propaganda.

• Peru and Dominican Republic: Electoral authorities have issued guidelines and fact-checking initiatives, but criminal law still focuses mainly on defamation.

• Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba: Among the earliest adopters of “anti-fake news” laws, but in highly restrictive ways, criminalizing dissent and consolidating censorship.

• Rest of Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala): Recent cybercrime and anti-gang legislation has been repurposed to cover online communication, raising alarms about authoritarian misuse.

Taken together, the region demonstrates no unified approach. Instead, responses oscillate between securitization, judicial intervention, legal inertia, and voluntary agreements.

Final Remarks

Latin America’s struggle with digital campaign regulation reveals a spectrum of different governance strategies. While Brazil embraces judicial activism and expansive interventions, Mexico maintains a deliberate legal vacuum, privileging self-regulation, and Uruguay relies on voluntary ethical pacts; other countries add to this mix with aborted legislative attempts, temporary commissions, or restrictive authoritarian laws.

What is notably absent is a consistent regional framework comparable to the EU’s Digital Services Act or Code of Practice on Disinformation. Given the prominence of WhatsApp, Facebook, and TikTok as common channels of disinformation in the region, and the fragility of institutions in parts of the region, future solutions must strike a delicate balance: ensuring transparency in digital political advertising, promoting media literacy, and safeguarding freedom of expression.

As the 2026 electoral cycle looms in multiple Latin American countries, the lessons are clear. Neither unchecked legal silence nor authoritarian censorship provide sustainable solutions. A rights-based, participatory, and transparent model of regulation, anchored in democratic principles rather than expedient responses, remains the region’s unfinished task.

The post Between Ethical Pacts and Musk’s Meltdown: Mapping Latin America’s Struggle to Regulate Digital Campaigns appeared first on Digital political campaigning.

15^th of July 2025

Carla Watanabe, JD candidate, Brazilian Institute of Education, Development and Research

&

Marcio Cunha Filho, JD, University of Brasília, Professor at the Brazilian Institute of Education, Development and Research

In August 2024, Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court (STF) ordered the suspension of Twitter, now X, across the country. Immediately, far-right congressmen filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), claiming that the STF was imposing unnecessary censorship in Brazil. But was the suspension of Twitter in Brazil an authoritarian act of online censorship? We argue that the suspension was a drastic but necessary measure to safeguard citizens; the deputy’s allegations must be understood through the lens of Brazil’s recent socio-political context.

The election of President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 was marked by the rampant spread of mis- and dis-information. In October 2018, the media exposed an orchestrated campaign by Bolsonaro supporters involving the mass dissemination of messages via WhatsApp, funded by illegal campaign donations. These messages spread falsehoods against opponents using illegally obtained segmented phone data and followed a strategy similar to the Cambridge Analytica scandal in the UK.

After the election, the malicious campaign strategy was not disbanded, instead shifting targets, for example targeting academics. Soon the Supreme Court itself became a major target of these attacks. Following rulings that displeased the new government, in January 2019, bots and superspreaders began coordinated attacks against the justices and families of the STF, as well as journalists. Media outlets aligned with President Bolsonaro amplified these baseless claims. During his inauguration, Bolsonaro directly fueled tensions with calls to “liberate the country” from “old institutions.” In March 2019, personal information of justices’ families was leaked, leading to calls for protests outside their homes and explicit threats to their lives, all framed in conspiratorial language.

In response, the STF’s Chief Justice launched Judicial Inquiry 4781, dubbed the “Fake News Inquiry”, and appointed Justice Alexandre de Moraes as rapporteur to lead the police investigation. Throughout 2019 the Federal Police identified patterns in these attacks, uncovering hierarchical structures distributing identical texts across countless profiles, with evidence of financial payments via PIX (Brazil’s instant payment system) to group administrators coordinating the attacks.

In 2020, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the STF ruled in favor of state and municipal autonomy to enact social distancing policies. This stance, contrary to the federal government’s downplaying of the pandemic’s severity, triggered a new wave of cyberattacks against the STF. Bolsonaro himself said that the Supreme Court sought to “break the country.” On 19 April 2020, with Bolsonaro present, a protest in Brasília featuring banners which demanded that the STF’s closure and the return of AI-5 – an act that curtailed freedoms during Brazil’s military dictatorship). Amid escalating threats to the rule of law, Inquiry 4828 (“Inquiry on Anti-Democratic Acts“) was launched shortly after the protest to investigate the origins and funders of these movements.

The inquiry revealed that the profiles spreading fake news during the election had also organized anti-democratic protests, and the businessmen funding fake news websites were also financing transport and infrastructure for demonstrations calling for the overthrow of Brazil’s democracy. In May 2020, the Federal Police executed warrants relating to both investigations. Seized phones exposed groups coordinating fake news dissemination and anti-democratic rallies using shared scripts, unified calendars and task divisions. Digital and physical actions were proven inseparable. Later in 2020, investigations found evidence linking the Presidential Office (“Gabinete do Ódio” or “Office of Hate”) to this organization, indicating coordination between the government and anti-democratic actors.

Thus, in April 2021, the STF extended the investigations of the “Digital Militias Inquiry“ to investigate the structure and financing of this organization. A professional hierarchy emerged: funders; ideologues; content managers; bot operators fueled by pseudo-journalistic content; and “influencers”. Between 2021-2022, further investigation revealed “digital militias” relied heavily on social media to spread false information, especially Twitter. In 2021, the STF ordered immediate suspension of fake news accounts and posts, but the platform often took several weeks to comply. New accounts subsequently emerged with identical content, migrating followers and monetization.

In 2022, Elon Musk acquired Twitter (now X). Musk declared “absolute free speech” on the platform and granted amnesty to banned accounts and gutting content moderation teams. Digital militias returned at full strength and attacked Brazil’s electoral system with calls for “armed oversight” of voting by the military.

Sowing distrust in the electoral system began after Bolsonaro’s 2018 election, claiming electoral fraud denied him a first-round victory. Attacks intensified during the pandemic, with coordinated digital assaults on the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) from 2020 onward. The following year, the former president held weekly livestreams alleging voting machines were insecure. On 29 July 2021, he presented a two-hour “proof” of systemic flaws, implicitly threatening to cancel the 2022 elections; senators classified this livestream as a threat to democracy.

The digital militia apparatus was then turned against the electoral system. Ongoing inquiries confirmed the same groups active since 2018 were behind these attacks. In 2022, their operations intensified: Bolsonaro summoned diplomats on 18 July to claim Brazil’s electoral system was untrustworthy, causing international embarrassment. On 7 September, he delivered explicit threats in a speech to supporters who chanted against STF justices. The STF ordered X to immediately block accounts coordinating these actions, but the platform delayed compliance and publicly questioned the order.

After President Lula won the October 2022 election, digital militias gathered thousands of Bolsonaro supporters in camps outside military barracks, contesting results and urging the military to prevent the new government’s inauguration. These efforts culminated first in the invasion of the Federal Police headquarters in mid-December, then an attempted terrorist attack at Brasília Airport by placing dynamite on a 60,000-liter kerosene truck.

The movement peaked on 8 January 2023, when thousands stormed and destroyed Brazil’s congressional, presidential, and judicial buildings, mirroring the U.S. January 6 Capitol riot. Federal Police investigations confirmed X was used as the primary platform to organize and mobilize these acts. Throughout 2023, the STF repeatedly ordered X to immediately block involved accounts, provide user data, and appoint a legal representative in Brazil. X ignored these orders, instead allowing anti-democratic content and monetization to persist.

From January-March 2024, facing non-compliance, the STF imposed daily fines of R$100,000 per profile, blocked advertising revenue, and threatened criminal liability for executives. Musk publicly attacked Justice Moraes, accusing Brazil of “judicial dictatorship” and defied all rulings.

By the first semester of 2024, the Digital Militias Inquiry found that X profited from this criminal organization via engagement, ad revenue, and X Premium monetization. Evidence further revealed ideological dis-alignment in Brazil: X complied with court orders from other countries while systematically challenging rules in Brazil. On 13 August, X closed its Brazil office and refused to appoint a legal representative. After ignoring subpoenas, Justice Moraes ordered X’s nationwide suspension on 30 August 2024, under Brazil’s Internet Civil Framework law. X resumed operations in October 2024 after appointing a legal representative physically located in Brazil, complying with the Supreme Court’s order.

Thus, X’s suspension in Brazil was not abrupt and did not come without warning.  The ban was a consequence of many years of investigations substantiating the platform’s central role in enabling attacks to Brazilian democracy: repeated defiance of court orders; refusal to appoint a legal representative; and deliberate protection of actors spreading fake news to overthrow institutions obstructing Bolsonaro supporters’ interests. This suspension was not censorship but a protective measure for Brazil’s rule of law.

The STF’s actions did however draw criticism from Bolsonaro supporters. The situation in Brazil even caused some international institutions to further investigate if freedom of expression was indeed being undermined in Brazil – for example, the special rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression of the OAE visited the country to investigate the situation. However, the court ultimately acted in line with opposing the rise of a “militant democracy” (a term conceptualized by Karl Loewenstein during Nazism’s rise), where democracy must resist authoritarian advances. Brazil’s democracy is young and fragile with a history of institutional ruptures. The 8 January 2023 insurrection—combined with a foiled plot to assassinate Justice Moraes, the elected president, and vice president conspiring to keep Bolsonaro in power—demonstrates the concrete danger posed by these actors. They exploited social media’s speed, rendering traditional legal tools ineffective against these crimes.

In July 2025, President Donald Trump released a letter announcing the imposition of 50% tariffs on all goods originating from Brazil, to begin on 1 August. In the letter, President Trump explicitly mentions that this taxation is being imposed not for economic reasons, but due to what he considers a “witch hunt” against Bolsonaro and his allies. It is important to recognize the connection between this event and the issues raised throughout this text. Despite all the uproar and fallacious arguments—such as the claim that the Brazilian Supreme Court is imposing censorship—it is crucial to expose the actions of Bolsonaro, Trump, and Musk and describe them for what their actions truly are: methods to attack and subvert Brazilian democracy, not legitimate forms of free speech. Brazilian institutions are holding strong, but no one knows if this scenario will persist.

The post Suspension of X in Brazil: Censorship or Defense of the Rule of Law? appeared first on Digital political campaigning.

by Ersida Teliti and Olta Stasa

Ersida Teliti is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Tirana

Olta Stasa is a PhD cadidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Tirana

1. Introduction: the use of TikTok in Albania

The launch of the online platform TikTok garnered significant attention from young people in Albania. By the end of 2024, the number of TikTok users in Albania is expected to reach 1.5 million, with most users aged between 12 and 25 years old. Despite initially used to upload videos or songs ranging from 3 seconds to 10 minutes, TikTok has become a hotspot of harmful content, including acts of violence, hate speech, the promotion of dangerous practices like self-harm and suicide, and other messages damaging young peoples’ mental health and wellbeing.

In contrast to many European countries where TikTok employs specific algorithms to monitor content and take appropriate actions to block or remove videos, this is not the case for Albania. The platform has yet to implement an algorithm which can detect and remove harmful content generated in the Albanian language. As a relatively small country, Albania may be perceived as a less significant market which could explain the lack of investment needed for the effective monitoring of posts. Albanian TikTok users are instead entirely reliant on a reporting mechanism to flag potentially harmful content. However, this approach is time-consuming and still allows harmful content to surface which can lead to adverse effects for vulnerable users on TikTok. Furthermore, Albania currently lacks a robust legal framework or appropriate legal bodies to trace and identify the individual(s) responsible for uploading harmful content. According to the current legal framework, the Electronic and Postal Communications Authority collaborates with other institutions, such as the police and the prosecutor’s office, to identify the internet service provider through which the content was uploaded. Yet there is no provision to obtain further granular data about the TikTok account holder who carried out the action. As a result of these lacklustre restrictions, TikTok in the Albanian language is rife with offensive and degrading language, as well as child sexual abuse content and messages encouraging younger users to engage in illegal activities, such as prohibited sexual acts, use of weapons and narcotics. The application has also been used for blackmail or threats between individuals, resulting in significant injuries and criminal behaviour among adolescents.

In August 2024, the Audiovisual Media Authority initiated a partnership with TikTok, focused on preventing the dissemination of harmful content. This partnership assisted with reporting videos which display or incite various forms of violence, contain hate speech, violate the rights of children and communities, and infringe fundamental human rights and freedoms. From August to December 2024, a total of 743 complaints were received, of which 291 were assessed as violations of the law,  286 video-audio materials were removed from the platform, while 5 remain under review. Among some of the videos reported following the partnership include:

• 20 videos involved acts of violence;
• 3 videos contained hate speech based on sexual orientation;
• 2 videos involved religious hatred;
• 31 videos depicted criminal offenses;
• 110 videos exposed children to pornography, narcotics, alcohol, tobacco, and violence;
• 107 videos incited violence and hatred;
• 13 audio recordings included language that exceeded moral and ethical standards.

2. The Influence of TikTok on Youth: Trends, Risks, and Social Dynamics

A series of high-profile events highlighted the risks of failing to properly regulate the platform and safeguard users. For example, in 2021 a 10 year child committed suicide due to a TikTok challenge, and a 13 year boy committed suicide due to a challenging game on TikTok. In 2023, a 15 year old boy was stabbed during a conflict with four teenagers aged 14-16, a conflict that started and continued on social media. And, in 2024, a 41 year woman committed suicide due to bullying on TikTok. Although the suspected individual was reported to the police, no action was taken by the responsible authorities.

The latest tragedy on 20 November 2024 catalysed the pause of TikTok in Albania. In an incident which shocked the Albanian public, a 14-year-old from Tirana was stabbed to death by a peer in a pre-mediated murder, due in part to online encouragement and reactions on TikTok transforming virtual threats into physical violence. One month after the incident, Prime Minister Edi Rama announced a drastic measure to suspend TikTok in Albania for one year. In response, TikTok disputed the decision, asserting that there is no evidence linking the murder to the use of its platform. After the reaction of civil society and ensuing protests, the Prime Minister of Albania, in collaboration with the Minister of Education and Sports, initiated a series of discussions with parents and teachers. The Council of Ministers approved Decision No. 151, dated March 6, 2025, “On taking temporary measures to avoid the negative impacts of the online platform ‘TIKTOK”. This act suspended access to TikTok within Albania for a period of up to 12 months, with the possibility of extension until the platform guarantees the necessary technical instruments to regulate platform access and reduce harmful content. Only when TikTok demonstrates the efficacy of these new instruments can the ban be reviewed and lifted.

3. TikTok Ban: Political Move or Social Safeguard?

Prime Minister Rama’s decision was opposed by representatives of civil society, journalists, media, and experts who have criticized the move as both undemocratic and a violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms. These groups deemed it incompatible with the Constitution of the Republic of Albania and the European Convention on Human Rights. Three civil society organizations filed a lawsuit in the Constitutional Court against this decision, arguing that it violated the freedom of expression and the press, and several rights, including within the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. [1]

At present, Albania is in the midst of an electoral campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled 11 May 2025. The decision to suspend access to TikTok, which entered into force on 6 March, has raised concerns about the potential restriction of freedom of expression for the 1.5 million Albanian users. There are also more legitimate concerns about the use of TikTok in political campaigns. These include potential irregularities in campaign financing and suspected foreign interference distorting electoral processes – already experienced in other European countries, somewhat justifying the temporary suspension of the platform.

The move to suspend TikTok reflects polarised debates about the role of social media in democratic processes. The opposition and other political figures have strongly criticized the decision, accusing it of being a form of political censorship. They have characterized the act as a clear display of fanaticism, intolerance, fear, and terror against free thought and expression.

In a comparative perspective of countries that have the TikTok platform, the primary concern has been national security or harmful content. Albania is the only country that has decided to suspend access to the online platform  within its territory, aiming to avoid its negative effects, particularly as a means of inciting violence which, especially amongst young people, can lead to problems in their psycho-social development.

4. A Question of Balance

The decision of the Constitutional Court will determine whether the concerns raised by civil society, the media and experts are valid, or whether it will uphold a disproportionate decision that lacks a clear regulatory mechanism or a thorough analysis of the platform’s impact. TikTok should be required to present a transparent and robust safety framework outlining concrete measures to support digital parenting and the protection of minors.

The framework could include:

• Installation of parental control filters that enable guardians to monitor and limit the content accessed by children.
• Mandatory age verification mechanisms at the point of account creation and regular system audits to detect underage usage.
• Inclusion of the Albanian language within the application’s interface, content moderation, and reporting tools to ensure accessibility and local relevance.

The Albanian Government, through institutions such as Ministry of Education and Sport, Minister of State for Youth and Children and the Audiovisual Media Authority, should continue and expand its role in media education by:

• Expand digital parenting campaigns targeting parents with up-to-date guidance on online risks, including hate speech, online games, sexual exploitation, and algorithmic manipulation.

• Ensuring that such information is made available across multiple platforms, in formats that are both engaging and understandable.
• Continue its online information dissemination strategies, ensuring multilingual and multimedia access, especially for rural or marginalized families.
• Collaborations with local NGOs and schools to expand reach, especially in underserved communities.

[1] This lawsuit has not yet been made public, but the authorities have received it from the parties that have initiated the case with the Constitutional Court.

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Disinformation Narratives in 2024 Georgian Parliamentary Elections

by Elita Khmelidze 

Georgia’s parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 was a turning point for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration path.  The results announced by Georgia’s Central Election Commission declared the ruling Georgian Dream Party won with a majority (53.93%), defeating the four major opposition parties. However, the results were soon questioned by local and international election observation missions, including Transparency International Georgia, International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), due to multiple irregularities. In particular, before the parliamentary elections, the ruling Georgian Dream Party (GD) resorted to misusing executive, institutional, and financial administration resources for electoral purposes. This included a myriad of illegal decisions and schemes to persecute civil society, opposition parties and critical media as well as instances of voter coercion. Some of these electoral irregularities reported by ISFED, included:

• Restricting observers’ rights
• Violation of inking procedures
• Presence of unauthorized persons at the polling station
• Physical violence
• Alleged vote-buying
• Violations related to ballots

The electoral campaign was characterized by highly divisive rhetoric and imagery. The campaign conducted by the ruling party Georgian Dream was framed in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and aimed to bolster the fear of war and instability within Georgian society.

Disinformation Campaigns

Instances of disinformation spread by the ruling party during the electoral campaign were highly prevalent. Disinformation spread by the GD party members conveyed an anti-Western character and aimed to discredit the Euro-Atlantic institutions across several discursive dimensions:

1. Protecting the Georgian traditional values from the West
2. Georgia’s engagement in the Russia-Ukraine war
3. The West’s goal to meddle in Georgia’s internal affairs
4. Russia as a viable partner for regaining Georgia’s territorial integrity

Narrative 1: The GD as a protector of the traditional Georgian values

According to this narrative, the West threatens traditional Georgian values. In particular, the narrative refers to family values and emphasises that the ruling party is the sole actor who protects traditional Georgian family values. However, opposition parties, media, and NGOs are considered puppets of the West who receive money to spread LGBT propaganda and replace traditional family values by corrupted Western values.

Narrative 2: The GD party as a guarantor of peace in Georgia

During the electoral campaign, the rhetoric of the GD party leaders was imbued with discourse related to the Russian-Ukraine war. The narrative divides Georgian society into two conflicting parts. One part is inclined to instability and escalation to war in Georgia while another one fears the war and promotes peace.

According to ruling party leaders there is a “Global War Party”, referring to the EU and USA, who aim to open the so-called “second front” in Georgia after a war in Ukraine and take advantage of Russia. The ruling party thus proposed a false choice: peace under the GD versus war under opposition rule. It is worth noting that banners spreading this disinformation narrative were widely scattered throughout Tbilisi. The banners call on Georgian voters to say no to war and choose peace.

Source : Radio Free Europe (2024)

Narrative 3: The West’s interference in Georgia’s internal affairs

The narrative describes the West’s attempt to take control of Georgia by overthrowing the ruling party and replacing them with opposition parties considered puppets of the EU and USA due to alleged accusations of getting funding from them. According to the narrative, the demonstrations held by Georgian civil society were orchestrated by the West to escalate the “Ukrainian Maidan revolution” in Georgia. The disinformation campaign aimed to discredit pro-European protests and influence public opinion towards the West.

Narrative 4: Russia as a viable partner to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity

The narrative suggests that the GD is the only party which can resolve the issue of Georgia’s breakaway regions in cooperation with Russia. The Georgian Dream leaders blame the previous government headed by Mikheil Saakashvili for escalating the war with Russia, portray him as a puppet of the West and ignore Russia’s accountability for the war. The founder of the GD, Bidzina Ivanishvili, even proposed that Georgians were obliged to apologise for escalating the 2008 August war with Russia.

Narrative 5: Russia’s role in spreading disinformation

The narratives disseminated by the GD party officials were identical to the Kremlin’s propaganda. This is why GD party leaders are usually lauded by the Kremlin’s prominent propagandists for their braveness in telling an alleged truth about the West. Moreover, Russia had interfered directly in Georgia to influence public opinion across diverse social media platforms. Fake accounts were created in an attempt to manipulate the Georgian political discourse and distort the truth by disseminating anti-Western disinformation and propaganda. The main goal of such meddling was to discredit the West and change the Georgian public’s mindset in favour of Russia.

Georgian Dreams’ disinformation campaigns: implications for the future of Georgia

The disinformation narratives disseminated by the ruling party during the electoral period are focused on several dimensions. In particular, the narratives emphasize the ruling party’s aim to protect traditional Georgian values from the West and suggest a false dilemma if the Georgian Dream party does not hold the power the war will erupt in Georgia too. Moreover, the narratives strengthen the fear that the West induces massive protests in Georgia to overthrow the current government and replace them with opposition parties. Finally, the ruling Georgian Dream Party is the only political force that can restore Georgia’s territorial integrity through dialogue with Russia.

The disinformation campaign conducted by the ruling party accompanied by Russia’s meddling in Georgia’s internal affairs through information war threatens Georgia’s democratic development and its aspiration to join the EU and NATO in the future. Furthermore, the recent visa restriction measures and economic sanctions imposed by several EU countries and the USA on the ruling party’s members and party leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili gave rise to harsher disinformation campaigns against the West. The deterioration of the relationship between Georgia and the USA pushes Georgia into international isolation and creates a fertile ground for Russia to strengthen its grip on Georgia.

Elita Khmelidze is a postgraduate student (MA in European and Global Studies) at the University of Padua, Italy. Her research interests include Russia’s post-Soviet hybrid warfare campaigns, in particular contemporary Russian propaganda. Previously, Elita has worked with several Georgian fact-checking organisations and think tanks debunking Russian disinformation.

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